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What this paper adds:  
 
What is already known on this subject  
Despite providing 90% of patient contacts in the NHS, primary care lags far behind 
secondary care in submitting and learning from incident reports. Several authors 
caution that blame culture is a key issue within the NHS and presents a major 
obstacle to learning from patient safety incidents.  
 
What this study adds 
Our study provides evidence that primary care incident reports are frequently used 
to attribute blame to others rather than to examine system failures. The extent of 
blame may be hindering rich opportunities to improve the quality of patient care.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Word Count: 274 
 
Objectives –To explore the frequency and nature of blame, a major cultural barrier to learning, within 
primary care patient safety incident reports from the National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). 
Design A cross-sectional mixed methods study with sequential exploratory analysis of a random 
sample of primary care incident reports with free text narratives submitted between April 2005 and 
September 2013. 
Setting – NHS primary care settings across England and Wales. 
Participants Healthcare professionals, administrative staff, patients, family members, carers, and 
others involved in submitting patient safety incidents into the NRLS 
Main Outcome Measures – Types and frequency of blame attributions evident in incident reports. 
Associations between the nature of the safety incident (incident type, type of contributory factors, 
severity of harm of the outcome) and frequency of blame. 
Results - Of 2148 incident reports, 975 (45%, 95% Confidence interval 43.2% to 47.5%) attributed 
blame, with 894 (92%) of these blaming someone other than the reporter. Blame occurred mostly in 
incidents involving poor communication and co-operation between different clinical teams and was 
least likely in routinely reported incidents (e.g. pressure ulcers). Blame was more likely to occur where 
staff or organisational factors contributed to an incident than for incidents where patient or equipment 
factors were involved. Blame was more likely in incidents where the severity of outcome was no harm.  
Conclusions Blaming others is common in primary care incident reporting with relatively little focus 
on systems failures. This is likely to limit the learning that can be achieved to improve safety for 
patients in primary care. Clinical staff need better training in human and systems factors to reclaim 
incident reports as a tool for improving patient safety.  
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Reporters’ fear of blame and retribution is a recognised barrier in all safety critical 
industries that seek to use the analysis of incidents as a method of improvement.1-9 In 
healthcare, under-reporting is the norm, although its degree varies; it has been 
estimated that reporting systems detect 7-15% of hospital adverse events.10 This 
represents a major missed opportunity to prevent harm from the multiple sources 
through which patients are exposed to risk from modern healthcare. The extent of 
blame attribution in incident reports, that may reflect the healthcare system’s culture 
and its ability to report and learn, is not known. 
 
Most studies of patient safety have been in hospital populations, yet, in the United 
Kingdom, primary care services provide 90% of all patient contacts.11 Whilst primary 
care lags behind secondary care in generating learning from incident reports,1. its 
special context presents additional challenges when it comes to reporting patient 
safety concerns. A report on whistleblowing in primary care12 emphasized how 
difficult it is to report confidentially or anonymously when working in relatively small 
clinical teams. Also, in some safety incidents, a team member involved may be the 
potential reporter’s direct employer.  
 
 
The patient safety movement is based on the philosophy that error and harm are 
almost always the result of poorly designed systems that lead individuals to make 
mistakes.2,13-16 In a minority of situations, where there is wilful misconduct or 
negligence, it is right that individual accountability should be enforced.  However, 
media and the political climate in many countries too often demand that individuals are 
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held responsible no matter what,13-15 whilst any opportunity for enlightening the public 
on the real explanation for serious incidents is lost in the fury of the moment. 
 
 
We could find no study that had sought to determine the extent and nature of 
attributions of blame within patient safety incident reports. We set out to examine a 
sample of such patient safety incidents reported from primary healthcare settings 
within a publicly funded healthcare system; the aim of our study was to identify and 
classify the types of statements of blame attribution made within the reports and relate 
this to the nature of the incidents. 
 
 
Methods 
Data Source 
The primary data for this study are taken from the National Reporting and Learning 
System (NRLS), a database containing 14 million patient safety incident reports from 
local healthcare organisations in England and Wales. A patient safety incident was 
defined as: “any unintended or unexpected incident that could have harmed or did 
harm a patient during healthcare delivery.”16 Reporting started on a voluntary basis in 
2003 but, since 2010, submitting reports to the NRLS became a mandatory 
requirement for all incidents that resulted in severe harm or death. Reports contained 
structured categorical information about geographical location, care setting, patient 
demographics, and the reporter’s perception of severity of harm  as well as free-text 
descriptions of the incident, potential contributory factors, and planned actions to 
prevent reoccurrence. The database is described in more detail in a study of patient 
safety-related hospital deaths in England.17  
 Study Population 
Criteria for inclusion in the study were that reports contained sufficient description to 
interpret, were not duplicates, and related to the provision of primary health care in 
England and Wales. The chosen study period was April 2005 to September 2013, the 
period when the largest cross-section of primary care data submitted to the NRLS 
were available (42,729 reports).  We combined all incident reports that had resulted in 
severe harm and death (1,199 reports) with a weighted random sample of incident 
reports where the outcome was no harm, low harm or moderate harm (12,500) to 
create a sample of 13,699 reports. The weighting gave priority to reports submitted 
from 2012 onwards to ensure the sample was current. This study population is 
described in more detail elsewhere.22 In a pilot study, we found blame descriptions in 
47% (401/857) of patient safety incident reports. In order to estimate the true 
frequency of blame descriptions within these primary care data with a 95% confidence 
interval width no greater than 2%, we calculated that a sample size of at least 2043 
incident reports was required. We drew a randomly selected sample of 2679 reports 
(to accommodate for the frequency of duplicates and reports with insufficient detail to 
interpret) from the 13,699 reports using a random number generator.  
 
 
Study design 
 
We took a sequential exploratory approach18 with qualitative, followed by quantitative, 
analysis, in this mixed-methods study. We conducted a content analysis19 of primary 
care incident reports according to the Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) 
Classification System20. Then, we scrutinised reports separately for statements of 
apparent blame and applied a coding framework for blame attribution.  We followed 
this with a descriptive statistical analysis of the frequency of blame categories within 
these reports.  
 
Data coding 
The free-text description, in conjunction with the structured information of each 
incident report was coded according to Primary Care Patient Safety (PISA) 
Classification System21,22. We coded the incident type (e.g. administration, referral or 
discharge planning), the contributory factors that the reporter described as contributing 
to the incident (e.g. staffing levels, staff knowledge levels or vulnerability of the patient) 
and the severity of the outcome according to the WHO International Classification for 
Patient Safety definitions23. More information on the coding method can be found in 
the PISA study protocol.22 At the analysis stage we excluded reports with insufficient 
free text to interpret and those that described an incident unrelated to healthcare, for 
example a patient falling in the GP surgery car park. Reports describing pressure 
ulcers have been excluded in previous work as they typically describe only the 
outcome rather than an incident type. However, pressure ulcers account for more than 
one in eight reports in the database so we included these as an ‘incident type’ to 
ensure the sample reflected the way incident reporting was actually used.22 
 
 
“Blame” was defined as making a judgement of deficiency or fault by a person or 
people in the free text. Each report was coded into one of two categories: “blame” or 
“no blame.” Where there was doubt, reports were coded as “no blame.”  Some reports 
described incidents in which patients or relatives made a complaint against an 
individual and these were included as containing “blame”. Where a reporter described 
failure of aspects of the system rather than a person, this was coded as “no blame”.  
 
We judged that there were five forms of blame statement (see Box 1) having trialled 
these in the (separate) pilot sample of 857 patient safety incident reports. Where 
(infrequently) a report contained more than one type of blame, we coded only the main 
type of blame.  One of us (JC) coded the categories and a random sample of 268 
(10%) reports was double-coded (by RW). We discussed discordance, and rectified 
discrepancies. We calculated a kappa coefficient to determine inter-rater reliability of 
coding for blame.  
 
Box 1: Categories of blame 
Blame 
focus 
Definition Example 
Blames 
self 
The reporter 
blames 
him/herself for the 
incident 
“Seen as temporary resident inguinal hernia awaiting operation. Was 
incarcerated (probably) and I acted on his history of this being reducible. I 
should have admitted him there and then and didn’t.  No complaint by 
patient” 
Blamed by 
another 
A third party 
individual blames 
the reporter for 
the incident 
“The patient was diagnosed as having penile cancer. He had attended the 
surgery on and off since [date] with urinary symptoms which seemed to 
respond to antibiotics. He saw every clinical member of the practice and 
was examined but due to a phimosis a thorough examination was 
impossible. He was referred for a possible hernia on [date] and to the 
urology department on [date] He was seen by both specialties within a 
week and diagnosis was confirmed. There has been a comment made to 
the family by a consultant that we should have spotted it sooner.” 
Blames 
another 
The reporter 
blames a third 
party individual 
for the incident 
“A terminally ill patient attended A&E in ? ? retention of urine . This patient 
has a syringe driver in situ with morphine and metoclopromide in. The 
syringe driver was clearly labelled as per policy but despite this the Dr 
who saw the patient in A&E took the syringe driver down and left the 
patient without any analgesia or anti-sickness medication. As a result the 
patient was in a lot of pain and was only given a small amount of oral 
analgesia after being in A&E for some hours. TOTALLY 
UNACCEPTABLE. Medication error critical incident. Complete lack of 
knowledge demonstrated by the Dr. Inadequate assessment lack of 
knowledge on behalf of the Dr and failure to listen to the patient as he did 
question why they were taking the syringe driver down.” 
Others 
blaming 
others 
A third party 
blames another 
third party 
individual for the 
incident 
“Patient had an appointment with the Doctor on Monday 9th June. Patient 
was in discomfort with problems swallowing and indigestion. This lady has 
an underactive thyroid, Crohn’s disease and takes medication for breast 
cancer. After a few days she felt very ill and thought it was the medication 
that had been prescribed on the day of her appointment. The patient 
contacted the practice on 12th June but the practice would / could not 
provide an appointment that day or indeed for 13th June. The doctor 
eventually agreed to do another prescription without her seeing her again 
(stemetil). When the patient went to collect the medication on 12th the 
pharmacist would not dispense the medication as it was not suitable for 
people with underactive thyroid and it was for vertigo / nausea / vomiting. 
The patient could not raise this issue with the practice as it closed 
Thursday afternoon. The patient added that this is not the first time that 
something has happened like this but did not elaborate. Going on to say 
that staff at his practice are rude and unhelpful and that the doctor ' has 
lost his way and doesn't care about the patients '” 
Unknown 
blame 
Blame identified 
but target or 
source of blame 
unclear. 
"Patient with rheumatoid arthritis on steroids was taken off bone 
protection medication for 1 year giving a " drug free holiday " to reduce 
the incidence of atypical fracture (without a review date to re - start) She 
had been on this medication for 7 years. Stopping this medication was 
inappropriate." 
No blame Report does not 
attribute blame 
“Histology and Cytology. No surname on specimen pot” 
 
 
Data analysis 
We calculated odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals (CI) of the odds of blame 
attribution (versus no blame attribution) and chi-squared tests  to assess the 
associations between attribution of blame and the following pre-specified variables: 
the type of incident described, the severity of the harm that occurred (no, low, 
moderate or severe harm or death), the number of contributory factors described for 
the incident, the nature of the contributory factor reported to have led to the incident 
developing. We integrated the quantitative findings with the emerging insights 
generated from the coding process.  
 
Ethical approval 
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board research risk review committee was consulted 
for ethical approval. As all reporter identifiers are removed before the submission of 
reports to the NRLS, ethical approval was not required for analysis of this anonymised 
dataset. (ABHB R&D Ref number: SA/410/13). 
 Results 
The initial random sample of 2679 patient safety incident reports was reviewed 
against the criteria for inclusion. In all, 531 patient safety incident reports were 
excluded either because there was insufficient free text (134) or, because they did 
not involve primary healthcare (397). This left 2148 patient safety incident reports for 
analysis. The patient safety incident reports came from a range of primary care 
settings: 1405 from general practice, 644 from community nursing services, and the 
remainder from community dentistry, mental health and pharmacy services.  
 
We found an attribution of blame statement in 45% (975/2148) of patient safety 
incident reports (95% confidence interval: 43.2% to 47.5%). Cohen’s kappa statistic 
for inter-rater reliability for coding of blame was calculated at κ=0.81 (95% confidence 
interval 0.74 to 0.88), indicating strong agreement24.  
 
Table 1: Frequency of blame attribution 
 Focus of blame 
 
 
Number of reports Percentage of reports 
rounded to nearest 
integer (%) 
Blames self 28 1% 
Blamed by another 13 1% 
Blames another 766 36% 
Others blaming others 128 6% 
Unknown blame 40 2% 
No blame 1173 55% 
TOTAL 2148 100% 
 
 
Table 1 shows that where blame was attributed, in 92% of cases (894/975) the 
reporter blamed someone else or reported another party blaming someone else. 
Blame was mostly attributed to other healthcare professionals, but in a small number 
of cases to patients or their relatives.  Reports identifying a situation where the 
reporter blamed themselves were uncommon: 2% (41/975) of reports containing 
blame.  
 
 
Along with Figure 1, table 2 shows that the three incident types most likely to be 
associated with blame were those involving discharge planning, communication 
problems and referrals. Incident reports involving: record keeping and documentation, 
pressure ulcers, and investigations were significantly less likely to contain blame than 
other incidents.  
Table 2: Likelihood of blame attribution in different types of incidents.(Odds ratios 
for odds of blame when incident type is present versus incident type absent). 
Incident type Number of 
reports 
% of total reports 
containing blame 
Odds 
ratio 
95% CI 
Discharge planning 33 82% 5.54 2.28 to 13.47 
Communication 36 69% 2.78 1.36 to 5.68 
Referral 170 66% 2.49 1.80 to 3.47 
Diagnosis and 
assessment 
62 65% 2.24 1.32 to 3.79 
 
Medication 417 60% 2.10 1.69 to 2.62 
Treatment 77 53% 1.39 0.88 to 2.19 
Administration 379 51% 1.34 1.08 to 1.68 
Equipment provision 94 45% 0.97 0.64 to 1.47 
Other 68 43% 0.89 0.55 to 1.45 
Vaccination  100 34% 0.61 0.40 to 0.93 
Investigations 251 33% 0.57 0.43 to 0.75 
Record keeping and 
documentation 
80 30% 0.50 0.31 to 0.82 
  
 
 
The greater the number of contributory factors the greater the likelihood was of an 
attribution of blame. Where incident reports described one or more contributory 
factors, 56% (482/865) attributed blame compared to 38% (493/1282) of reports 
without contributory factors. Table 3 shows the ratio for the odds of blame for each 
type of primary contributory factor against the odds of blame in the other three 
categories. Blame of a person was significantly less likely where equipment failures or 
patient factors contributed to the incident. Reports where organisational problems 
were identified as the primary contributory factors, for example low staffing levels or 
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Figure 1:Percentage of reports containin blame by type of incident (with 95% 
CI) 
Pressure Ulcer 381 19% 0.22 0.17 to 0.29 
long waiting lists, were more likely to contain blame of an individual, as were incidents 
in which staff members had poor knowledge or failed to follow procedures.  
Table 3: Blame and contributory factors. Odds ratios comparing odds of blame 
where contributory factor is present versus odds of blame where an alternative 
contributory factor is present  
Type of contributory factor Number of 
reports 
% that contain 
blame 
Odds 
ratio 
95% CI 
Staff factors 
(e.g. staff knowledge, failure to 
follow protocols) 
351 65% 1.90 1.44 to 
2.51 
Organisational factors 
(e.g. staffing level, continuity of 
care)  
216 62% 1.38 1.01 to 
1.89 
Patient factors  
(e.g. frailty, language barrier) 
263 42% 0.45 0.33 to 
0.61 
Equipment factors 
(e.g. faulty or missing 
equipment) 
35 29% 0.31 0.14 to 
0.64 
No contributory factors 
reported 
1283 39% - - 
Total for all reports 2148 45% - - 
 
 
Severity of harm to the patient, ranging from no harm to death was described in 1475 
incident reports with 48% (712/1475) of these containing blame. Table 4 shows that 
reports describing no harm to the patient were significantly more likely to describe 
blame than those where the patient was harmed. This was also the case for each 
type of blame attribution (data not presented). 
 
 
 
Table 4: Blame and severity of harm. Odds ratios showing odds of blame for 
each level of harm compared with odds of blame for all other harm levels. 
WHO ICPS 
Harm Level 
Classification 
Number 
of 
reports 
% 
that contain 
blame 
Odds ratio 95% CI 
No harm 271 59% 1.70 (1.30 to 2.22) 
Mild 1028 46% 0.75 (0.60 to 0.94) 
Moderate 149 48% 0.97 (0.69 to 1.37) 
Severe 21 10% 0.11 (0.03 to 0.48) 
Death 6 83% 5.39 (0.628 to 
46.24) 
Not reported 673 39% - - 
Total 2148 45% - - 
 
Discussion 
Blame featured in almost half of the patient safety incident reports (975/2148) and was 
usually directed at others; in 92% of these cases (894/975), blame was attributed to 
someone other than the reporter. The frequency of blame varied depending on the 
type of incident described in the report, the type of contributory factors involved and 
the severity of harm to the patient.  
 
A fear of being held personally accountable is said to explain much of the reluctance 
of front-line healthcare staff to use formal incident reporting systems to communicate 
their concerns about unsafe situations that they observe.2,9,24-27 Whilst previous studies 
and commentaries in this field of patient safety have described how blame hinders 
reporting, our study is the first to identify and characterise its use by those making 
incident reports.   
 
Dixon-Woods and colleagues’ work28,29 advocates the importance of “soft 
intelligence”29 - the wealth of experiences from front line clinical staff about the reality 
of the system which can only thrive where staff feel valued and respected.28 They 
recognise that historically, despite its potential, incident reporting has failed to provide 
this soft intelligence or support this ethic. Improvement in patient safety based on 
learning from incident reports cannot be achieved unless healthcare is free of an 
atmosphere of blame2,14,15. The European Commission’s Patient Safety and Quality of 
Care working group advocates that for improvements to be made, health service 
managers must “spread the message of a ‘blame-free and non-punitive objective’” and 
move on from a “culture of blame and accountability to focus on learning to prevent 
errors from happening again, and thereby motivate reporting.”30 This sentiment is also 
echoed in the WHO Patient Safety Curriculum31 for all healthcare professionals.   
 
Whilst this is not a representative sample of all incidents, the extent of blame evident 
in these reports (975/2148, 45%) by frontline clinical staff, in their descriptions of 
events that led to patient safety incidents, suggests that progress towards this blame-
free and supportive culture is slow. This could have several explanations.  
 
Firstly, it may reflect the outlook and behaviour of those working in a culture in which 
seeking personal accountability for errors is placed ahead of identifying the scope for 
learning.8 Coles et al32 found that hospital clinicians had little confidence that 
managers would deal with reports in a blame-free way – there was a perception of 
“heavy-handed retribution” and suggestion from hospital managers that incident 
reports were being used by reporters to “cover one’s own back” in the event of a 
patient safety incident. We found that 92% (894/975) of reports attributing blame 
pointed the finger at someone other than the reporter. In addition, the incident types 
most likely to involve blame (i.e. incidents involving discharge planning, 
communication and making referrals) often involved reporters attributing blame to a 
member of staff in a different department or team from their own. In such 
circumstances, staff may be doing what they think is expected of them by managers, 
or they may be fearful of disciplinary action and seek to absolve themselves by 
blaming others. That culture could prevail within a local organisation or across the 
health system as a whole. However, the finding that blame was less likely when 
there has been harm to a patient (with the exception of the very small category of 
reports about a death) may suggest that staff are aware of the value of more 
balanced reporting when more serious incidents have occurred.  
 
Secondly, there are many common misconceptions about human factors33 and staff 
may not fully realise that most unsafe situations arise from system weaknesses that 
precipitate human error and also increase the likelihood of its adverse impact. This 
may reflect that patient safety science does not yet feature strongly in the curricula of 
education and training programmes for healthcare professionals.34 Our results show 
that only 40% of reports (865/2148) described any contributory factors; reporters may 
be using the language of blame to “explain” incidents rather than consider ing the 
human and systems factors at play. These contributory human and systems factors 
could provide valuable organisational learning. However, if clinical staff do not 
consider and report them, the “soft-intelligence” they might offer will not be available 
to maximise learning from the incidents  28,29.  
 
Thirdly, the causation of harm in primary care settings may be different to that 
encountered in hospitals. Almost all the studies of errors in healthcare have examined 
secondary care and patient safety in primary care has been much less studied.16 All 
safety incidents are caused by a complex interaction of individual actions and system 
failures. Usually, the greater weight in interpreting causation is given to system-related 
factors but it is possible that in primary care, the role of the individual clinician is a 
stronger influence on the generation of harm and that blame of an individual may 
therefore be more common when incidents happen.  Many decisions and judgments 
in primary care are made on an individual basis and not always with the checks and 
balances that a larger team provides, as in hospital-based services12. This is 
particularly so for specific areas of patient safety like diagnostic error which is highly 
dependent on the actions or omissions of an individual in primary care, and for which 
we found higher odds of blame than other incidents. However, our previous studies 
have confirmed the strong role of system factors also in the causation of incidents in 
primary care17. In this respect, primary care does not appear very different to other 
care settings.  
 
 We used a well-established coding method20, discussion of data extraction, coding 
and analyses of the reports at weekly meetings, and a high level of coding agreement 
(Cohen’s kappa >0.8) to ensure methodological rigour.  This study examines 
associations with blame attribution and offers new insights into the way incident 
reports are used. Conclusions of this study should, however, be interpreted with 
caution: selection bias in reporting is important,35 rendering this analysis essentially 
inductive rather than deductive; the quality of incident report analysis is also heavily 
reliant on the use of non-standardised terminology, subjective interpretation of events 
during reporting, and the depth of information provided by the reporter.32,36  Further 
research should explore the social and cultural influences on reporters’ motivations 
and their understanding of the potential impact of blame. This, and a comparative 
analysis of blame in secondary care incident reporting, would enable the effective 
targeting of interventions to improve the learning from these reports. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This study is the first exploration of the frequency and nature of blame within primary 
care patient safety incident reports. Improvement in patient safety from incident 
reporting cannot be achieved unless healthcare culture is free from an atmosphere 
of blame.  However, our analysis shows that reports have often been used to blame 
other members of staff rather than to offer insight into underlying system factors 
contributing to incidents. Incident reports reflect the overall culture of blame that 
clinical staff work in and they need more training in recognising human and systems 
factors when incidents happen.  Recognising these factors would allow better 
opportunities for system learning, using the wealth of soft intelligence that frontline 
staff have, and which is essential for the development of resilient, blame-free 
learning organisations.   
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